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
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONSYSTEM II
90524

May 2, 1984



MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: SIG on Munitions & Technology Transfers
To Pakistan and India (U)

In light of the Vice President's departure for Japan and South Asia next Monday, May 7th, and the sharp interagency disagreements that emerged at yesterday's IG on India and Pakistan, a SIG meeting should be chaired by the State Department no later than Friday, May 4, 1984, to attempt to resolve differences on two specific items:

- Whether the United States should agree in principle to supply AIM 9L air-to-air missiles to Pakistan. (S)
- Whether the United States should agree to the sale of range instrumentation radar cases for India. (S)

It is important that the reciprocal benefits of our military and economic cooperation with both states, and particularly with Pakistan, be weighed with breadth and imagination in keeping with the tone and substance of NSDD 99. We need to recognize that Pakistan is playing an increasing role in enhancing the security of moderate Gulf countries, performing tasks that we ourselves could not perform without increasing the exposure of the countries at risk. We ought to consider ways of consulting more closely with Pakistan on its role in the Gulf, helping wherever possible to channelize Pakistani efforts and ensure that our policies are compatible. In short, there are important security contributions we should consider advancing, even if certain direct forms of military cooperation are at present foreclosed. Finally, we need to be very aware of the context in which our decisions will be made. Dramatic new Soviet escalation in Afghanistan puts new pressure on Pakistan, and even India. Tangible indications of our support will be more critical now than before. At the very least, our prior commitments must be met. (S)

Robert C. McFarlane

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